Покупка AAVE: как инвестировать в токен Aave и DeFi

Title: Decentralization in Name Only: Lessons from the Failed Aave Vote

Author: AI Editor (updated version)
Publication Date: 26.05.2024

Introduction

The failed vote to suspend Aave founder Stani Kulechov in April 2022 revealed a critical gap between the ideals of decentralization and the reality of concentrated influence, even within leading DAOs. This case proves that high token concentration and the passivity of major delegates undermine on-chain governance, turning it into a mere formality. In this article, we analyze why the vote failed, how power is actually distributed in Aave, and what specific steps other DAOs can take to avoid similar pitfalls.

Methodology and Data Transparency

The analysis is based on publicly available data for the period from April 29 to May 5, 2022.

Sources:
- Snapshot voting: "AIP-62: Should Stani be suspended…"
- Forum discussion: "[ARFC] Suspend Stani from Aave Governance…"
- On-chain data: Etherscan, Ethereum blockchain snapshot at block 14696969 (May 1, 2022, 12:00 UTC).
- Aggregated data: Dune Analytics dashboard (specific dashboard indicating the query version).
Address Aggregation Algorithm:
To calculate the concentration of voting power (top 100 holders), the following approach was used:
1. Addresses labeled on Etherscan and Nansen as centralized exchange (CEX) wallets were excluded from the sample to separate exchange user votes from direct influence.
2. Multisig wallets and smart contracts not identified as infrastructure-related (e.g., Aave Ecosystem Reserve) were included in the count as single entities.
3. The calculation includes both self-held voting power (AAVE on balance) and delegated power received from other addresses, reflecting real influence in Snapshot votes.
Limitations:
The study does not account for internal team token vesting agreements that might have restricted their actual availability for sale, but not for voting.

Timeline of the Incident (UTC)

April 29, 2022, 14:03 UTC: Stani Kulechov, founder of Aave, posts a tweet: "BREAKING: joining twitter as interim CEO."
April 29, 2022, ~21:00 UTC: Twitter temporarily suspends Kulechov’s account (restored in less than 24 hours).
April 30, 2022, 18:45 UTC: A thread is created on the Aave governance forum with a proposal to suspend Kulechov. One commenter states: "This behavior undermines trust in the entire project and looks like preparation for a 'rug pull'" (link to forum comment).
April 30, 20:00 UTC — May 3, 20:00 UTC: A Snapshot vote takes place on the proposal: "TEMP CHECK: Should Stani be suspended from Aave Governance for 3 months?"

The Anatomy of Power in Aave: Tokenomics and Delegation

Criticism of Aave’s centralization begins with the initial token distribution during the migration from LEND to AAVE in 2020.

Note on Team Share Calculation:
The total supply after migration was 16,000,000 AAVE (13M for LEND exchange and 3M in reserve). The team and founders converted their LEND into 3,000,000 AAVE, representing 18.75% (3/16) of the total supply, laying the foundation for their significant influence.
Source: official Aave migration documentation.

This concentration is exacerbated by delegation mechanics, where holders transfer voting rights to active participants. Data analysis for May 2022 shows:

~42% of all voting power was delegated.
The top 10 delegates (including funds and major holders) controlled ~65% of all delegated power, or ~27% of the protocol's total voting power.

This creates a situation where overcoming the quorum on any contentious issue requires the participation or tacit consent of a very narrow group of individuals.

Visualization 1: Pie chart showing the distribution of voting power in Aave. Sectors: "Top 10 wallets (34%)", "Top 11–100 wallets (24%)", "Other holders (42%)". Caption: "Concentration of voting power in Aave (including delegation) as of May 1, 2022. Source: calculations based on Etherscan and Dune Analytics data."

Voting Results: A Symptom, Not a Solution

The initiative to suspend Kulechov failed due to catastrophically low turnout.

Table 1. Snapshot Voting Results (30.04–03.05.2022)

Parameter	Value	% of Quorum
Established Quorum (Temp Check)	80,000 AAVE	100%
Total Votes Cast	~1,525 AAVE	1.9%
"For" Votes (YAE)	1,500.89 AAVE	—
"Against" Votes (NAE)	24.11 AAVE	—

Source: Snapshot voting page. Author's calculations.

The vote's failure is a direct consequence of power concentration. Major delegates and the Aave team itself, who possess decisive voting power, ignored the initiative, deeming it insignificant. This demonstrates that voting rights do not equal real participation, and the "will of the community" can be easily ignored by passive "whales."

Visualization 2: Sankey diagram showing delegation flows. Left — groups of holders ("small", "medium"). Right — top 5 delegates (e.g., "ParaFi Capital", "DeFiance Capital", "Stani Kulechov"). Flow width shows how votes from thousands of small holders concentrate among a few large delegates. Caption: "Concentration of delegated power among Aave's largest delegates."

Systemic Issue: Comparison with Other DAOs

The incident in Aave is not unique and reflects a systemic problem of conflict of interest in DeFi.

SushiSwap (September 2020): Anonymous founder Chef Nomi withdrew approximately $14M from the developer fund, triggering a crisis of confidence. The conflict was only resolved after he returned the funds under community pressure and transferred control of the protocol to a multisig wallet. (Source: Coindesk.)
Uniswap (February 2023): Venture capital firm a16z used its 15 million UNI tokens to single-handedly defeat a proposal to deploy the protocol on the BNB Chain. This led to allegations of conflict of interest, as a16z was a major investor in LayerZero—a competing bridge that would have lost out if the proposal had passed. (Source: Blockworks.)

These cases prove that the concentration of power among founders or venture investors is a structural risk for any DAO.

Lessons and Practical Recommendations for DAOs

The Aave case highlights the need to implement more mature social and technical governance mechanisms.

Develop and Implement a Code of Conduct:
- Tool: Create a public document based on templates from Gitcoin DAO or Yearn, defining behavioral standards for key participants and sanctions for violations.
- Risks: Overly strict rules may stifle free speech; the sanctioning process could become politicized.
Introduce a Conflict of Interest Policy:
- Tool: Require delegate candidates and core team members to complete a disclosure of potential conflicts of interest before participating in key votes.
- Risks: Difficulty of enforcement regarding anonymous participants; reliance on the honesty of self-reporting.
Experiment with Alternative Voting Mechanisms:
- Tool: Pilot quadratic voting for grant distribution or secondary decisions. Use identity verification systems (e.g., Proof of Humanity, BrightID) to protect against Sybil attacks.
- Risks: High implementation complexity, potential reduction in UX for users, incomplete protection against coordinated attacks.

Conclusion: What to Do Next?

The incident with Stani Kulechov served as a stress test for Aave, revealing the weakness of a purely technological approach to governance. When real power is concentrated in the hands of a few, voting mechanisms become theater.

Priority Steps for DAOs:

Conduct a Power Audit: Analyze and visualize the real distribution of tokens and delegated votes to understand who actually makes the decisions.
Implement Social Protocols: Develop a code of conduct and conflict of interest policies as mandatory elements of governance.
Diversify Voting Mechanisms: Test models resistant to "whale" influence (e.g., quadratic or time-weighted voting) for different types of decisions.

Questions for Further Research:

How does power concentration in a DAO change as it matures and tokens are distributed from the treasury?
What is the real effectiveness of delegation programs in improving the quality of governance decisions, rather than just reaching a quorum?

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